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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case involves an appeal following the issuance of the
Order of the United States District Court for the District of New
Union, granting Jim Bob Bowman’s motion for summary
judgment and denying New Union Wildlife Federation’s motion
for summary judgment. R. 1. The district court had proper
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case under the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has proper jurisdiction to
hear appeals from any final decision of the United States District
Court for the District of New Union. 28 U.S.C § 1291 (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Does an association have standing to sue for a violation of
the Clean Water Act (CWA), when its members
experience an abstract feeling of loss over the alterations
to a wetland that cannot be seen without trespassing, and
their concerns about increasing pollution have neither
been substantiated nor affected their enjoyment of a
nearby river?
2. Under CWA § 301, does the mere presence of dredged and
fill material in a wetland constitute an ongoing violation
of a § 404 limitation, when the language of the statute
indicates that its violation occurs only with the
commission of a specific and discrete act?
3. Under CWA § 505(b), will the prior prosecution of a CWA
violation by a state agency preclude a subsequent citizen
suit for the same violation when the agency has promptly
negotiated for immediate compliance as well as valuable
concessions from the alleged violator?
4. Under CWA § 301, does transferring material within a
wetland constitute an “addition” of a pollutant, when no
material is added from outside of the wetland?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Court is being asked to affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment against appellant New Union Wildlife
Federation (“NUWF”) on all four of its stated grounds. NUWF
commenced the present action against appellee Jim Bob Bowman
(“Mr. Bowman”) in the United States District Court for the
District of New Union on August 30, 2011. R. 3. NUWF’s citizen
suit was brought pursuant to § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). R. 3. The NUWF complaint alleged
that Mr. Bowman violated CWA § 301(a) by filling the wetland on
his property without a § 404 permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1344; R. 3.
NUWF sought civil penalties and an order requiring Mr. Bowman
to restore the wetland previously occupying his property. R. 5.
New Union Department of Environmental Protection (“NUDEP”),
having commenced another CWA § 505(a) lawsuit against Mr.
Bowman twenty days earlier, promptly intervened in the present
action. Id. NUWF also filed motions to intervene in NUDEP’s
lawsuit and to consolidate the two actions; both of NUWF’s
motions are pending in the district court. Id.
Following discovery, Mr. Bowman and NUWF filed crossmotions for summary judgment.
Mr. Bowman moved for
summary judgment against NUWF on four separate grounds: (1)
NUWF lacked standing to sue under the CWA for lack of an
injury to its members traceable to his actions; (2) the district
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate NUWF’s citizen suit
because it alleged a violation that was wholly past; (3) NUWF’s
citizen suit was barred under CWA § 505(b) because of NUDEP’s
diligent prosecution; and (4) NUWF failed to establish that he
caused an “addition” of any pollutants to the wetland. Id.
Conversely, NUWF moved for summary judgment against Mr.
Bowman on the ground that Mr. Bowman had added dredged and
fill material to navigable waters from a point source without a §
404 permit. Id. At the same time, NUDEP, as intervenor, joined
Mr. Bowman’s motion on the second (continuing violation) and
third (diligent prosecution) issues, and opposed his motion on the
first (standing) and fourth (CWA violation) issues. Id.
On June 1, 2012, the district court entered summary
judgment for Mr. Bowman on all four issues and against NUWF
on its CWA claim, ruling: (1) NUWF lacked standing; (2) the
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court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Bowman’s actions
because they were wholly past; (3) NUWF’s lawsuit was barred by
prior state action; and (4) no violation of the CWA had occurred.
R. 11. Following entry of summary judgment, NUWF and
NUDEP each filed timely notices of appeal before this Court. R.
1. NUWF now takes issue with all four of the district court’s
rulings, while NUDEP challenges only the first (no standing) and
fourth (no CWA violation) rulings. Id. This Court granted review
on September 15, 2012. R. 2.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. The Bowman Property
Mr. Bowman owns a thousand-acre property situated along
the Muddy River near Mudflats, New Union. R. 3. The Muddy
River forms a natural border between the states of New Union
and Progress, stretching some forty miles above and below the
Bowman property. Id. The River is approximately six feet deep
and 500 feet wide as it flows past the Bowman property, which
allows this portion of the river to be used for recreation. Id.
Much of the Bowman property is covered by an occasionally
inundated swamp. The property is classified as a wetland under
the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ Wetlands
Delineation Manual, in part because portions of the property are
at least partially inundated when the river is high. R. 3-4. Until
2011, the Bowman property remained virtually undeveloped,
covered with trees and other vegetation typical of a wetland. R.
4. Despite its huge size, only about 650 feet of the property abuts
the Muddy River. R. 3. Nevertheless, the entire property is
located within the river’s hundred-year flood plain and is
hydrologically connected to the river. Id.
2. The Project
On June 15, 2011, Mr. Bowman set about developing the
swamp into farmland, on which he hoped to eventually grow
wheat. R. 4. He began by using a bulldozer to cut out trenches,
knock down trees, and level vegetation. Id. The resulting debris
was pushed into windrows that were at least partially burned

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/4

4

2013]

BEST BRIEF: APPELLEE

87

and pushed into the trenches. Id. The field was then leveled
with soil from higher areas and redistributed into lower-lying
areas. Id. Finally, Mr. Bowman drained the field by forming a
wide ditch, or “swale,” running from the back of his property into
the river. Id.
Shortly after work started, NUWF, a local nonprofit
corporation organized to protect New Union fish and wildlife
habitats, became aware of Mr. Bowman’s activities. R. 4. On
July 1, 2011, NUWF notified Mr. Bowman of its intent to sue
under the citizen suit provision of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365; R.
4. A copy of the notice was also sent to NUDEP, the agency in
charge of implementing the CWA in the State of New Union. Id.
The validity of this notice is not contested by either Mr. Bowman
or NUDEP. Id. By July 15, 2011, Mr. Bowman had ceased
clearing and filling his land. Id. Although most of the land had
been filled, he left the portion of the property along the Muddy
River untouched. R. 4. The property adjacent to the Muddy
River, and 150 feet inland, remains densely wooded. Id.
3. Prosecution by NUDEP
Upon receipt of NUWF’s notice of intent to sue, NUDEP
contacted Mr. Bowman and informed him that his activities
violated state and federal law. R. 4. Although Mr. Bowman still
maintains that his activities were not illegal, he promptly entered
into a settlement agreement with NUDEP. Id. Under the terms
of the agreement, Mr. Bowman agreed not to clear any more
wetlands. Id. He also agreed to convey to NUDEP a 225-foot
wide conservation easement along the Muddy River,
incorporating the 150-foot wide unaltered swamp with an
additional seventy-five-foot wide buffer zone. Id. This easement
will be dedicated to the public for appropriate recreational
purposes, and Mr. Bowman will create a permanent wetland that
he will maintain year-round in the buffer zone. Id. Once fully
established, the new partially-inundated wetland will provide an
even richer wetland habitat than existed before. R. 6.
On August 1, 2011, NUDEP incorporated its agreement with
Mr. Bowman into an administrative order, issued pursuant to
New Union’s equivalent of § 309 (a) and (g) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(a), (g). And though the New Union statute would have

5
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authorized the imposition of $125,000 in civil penalties against
Mr. Bowman, NUDEP elected to forego penalties in exchange for
his immediate concessions. R. 4, 7. On August 10, 2011, NUDEP
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
New Union, seeking to have the settlement agreement and
subsequent administrative order entered as a consent decree
(“NUDEP Lawsuit”). R. 5. NUDEP’s motion for entry of a
consent decree, unopposed by Mr. Bowman, is currently pending
before the district court, as is a motion by NUWF to intervene in
the NUDEP Lawsuit. R. 5.
4. Attempted Prosecution by NUWF
On August 30, 2011, NUWF commenced the action presently
before this Court (“NUWF Lawsuit”). R. 5. Like the NUDEP
Lawsuit, the NUWF Lawsuit also attempts to prosecute Mr.
Bowman for violating the CWA. Id. But, unlike the NUDEP
Lawsuit, the NUWF Lawsuit seeks the imposition of civil
penalties against Mr. Bowman, as well as an order that would
require the removal of all fill material and the restoration of the
former wetland. Id. NUDEP successfully moved to intervene in
the NUWF Lawsuit shortly after the complaint was filed. Id.
NUWF has submitted affidavits from three of its members,
Dottie Milford, Zeke Norton, and Effie Lawless, attempting to
establish an injury from Mr. Bowman’s actions. R. 6. All three
member-affiants followed the same basic narrative in their
testimony. They each use the Muddy River and its banks near
the Bowman property for boating, fishing and picnicking. Id.
None claim that these activities are affected by Mr. Bowman’s
project. Id. They admit that they are unable to see any changes
to Mr. Bowman’s property, either from the Muddy River or its
banks. Id. The newly-planted wheat field remains completely
hidden behind over 150 feet of densely wooded swamp. Id.
Nevertheless, the member-affiants insist they “feel a loss”
over the swamp’s disappearance. R. 6. In their opinions,
wetlands such as the one previously on Mr. Bowman’s property
provide valuable ecological benefits, which include absorbing
ambient sediment and pollutants from the river and serving as
buffer zones during floods. Id. Since they cannot see Mr.
Bowman’s field, they assert their loss stems from the fear that
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the Muddy River is now more polluted and could become more
polluted if other nearby landowners also fill their wetlands. Id.
Their fears are based only on their opinions and beliefs, and
NUWF has not offered any corroborating expert testimony. One
member, Dottie Milford, testifies that the Muddy River looks
“more polluted” to her, without further elaboration or
substantiating evidence. Id.
Another member, Zeke Norton testifies that he had “frogged”
the area for years. R. 6. He recalls that the Bowman property
used to be an especially good area for “frogging,” but now there
are no frogs in the drained field. Id. He claims that he would be
lucky to find even two or three “good sized frogs” in the wooded
area. Id. Mr. Norton acknowledges that he might have been
trespassing when he frogged on the Bowman property. Id.
Under the terms of Mr. Bowman’s settlement with NUDEP, Mr.
Norton will now be permitted to legally frog in the wooded area
and buffer zone, and the area is expected to be an even richer
habitat for the frogs. R. 4, 8.
Fields of wheat, planted in September 2011, now cover the
entire Bowman property, save the 225-foot easement. R. 5. Mr.
Bowman has no plans to fill or drain the easement or any other
wetlands. R. 7. Construction of the new wetland habitat,
pending issuance of the consent decree, is estimated to be
considerably expensive, with maintenance costs as of yet
unknown. R. 8.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case concerns the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, which is a question of law. An appellate court reviews
the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standard as a district court. E.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 557-58 (1988). Facts are viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, but only when there is a genuine dispute
as to those facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party is
unable to show a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court properly granted summary judgment on all
four issues because: (1) NUWF does not have standing; (2) the
CWA precludes a citizen suit when a plaintiff alleges only wholly
past CWA violations; (3) NUWF’s suit is barred by NUDEP’s
diligent prosecution of Mr. Bowman; and (4) Mr. Bowman’s
actions did not result in any “addition” of a pollutant under the
CWA.
First, NUWF cannot establish standing because it does not
show that any of its members would have standing to sue in his
own right. One member, Zeke Norton, asserts only that his
enjoyment of “frogging” on Mr. Bowman’s property has been
impaired—an entirely illegal activity. Another member, Dottie
Milford, believes that the Muddy River now “looks more polluted,”
but fails to specify what she means by such an ambiguous
comment. Nevertheless, all three insist that they feel a loss over
the disappearance of the wetland because they fear it has
resulted in increased pollution. Neither they, nor NUWF,
support these fears with any kind of evidence. Subjective
apprehensions such as these do not amount to an injury,
especially when they clearly have not diminished any aesthetic or
recreational enjoyment of the Muddy River.
Even if there were an increase in pollution, it is certainly not
fairly traceable to Mr. Bowman’s actions. NUWF does not argue
that Mr. Bowman has caused pollution. Instead, it contends that
other sources, wholly unrelated to Mr. Bowman, caused an
increase in pollution. NUWF’s theory is far too attenuated to
establish causation for standing purposes. Additionally, it is
unlikely that NUWF can be redressed by the relief it seeks. If
Mr. Bowman’s alleged violation is indeed now wholly past, the
civil penalties are completely unavailable, and any injury actually
caused, if any, has already been remedied by NUDEP’s
administrative order and pending consent decree. Thus, all three
elements of standing are not satisfied.
Second, the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over NUWF’s claim because NUWF fails to allege a
continuing CWA violation. Mr. Bowman has ceased all land
clearing activities and there is no realistic possibility that he will
resume them again. Instead, NUWF relies on an imaginative
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theory that the mere presence of dredged and fill material
constitutes a continuing violation.
However, this theory
contradicts the plain language of the CWA, ignores the Supreme
Court’s holding in Gwaltney of Smithfield, LLC v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, and is unsupported by the authorities that
NUWF cites. NUWF alleges nothing more than a continuing
impact on the environment from a past discharge, which will not
suffice.
Third, NUWF’s suit is also barred under CWA § 505(b)
because NUDEP has commenced a civil action against Mr.
Bowman for the same violation and is diligently prosecuting that
action to ensure compliance. NUDEP’s civil action, filed twenty
days prior to the present action, is presumed diligent because
Congress intended the states to be the primary enforcers of the
CWA. NUWF cannot meet the heavy burden to overcome this
presumption because NUDEP has proactively negotiated a
consent decree that requires Mr. Bowman to cease all CWA
violations immediately and effectuate environmental benefits at
considerable costs to Mr. Bowman.
Fourth, Mr. Bowman’s land-clearing activities do not
constitute an “addition” of a pollutant under the CWA because he
merely transferred material from one part of the wetland to
another. An “addition” occurs only when a pollutant is first
introduced into navigable waters from the “outside world.” This
definition was recently incorporated into an EPA regulation and
thus, is entitled to Chevron deference. When Mr. Bowman’s
activities are viewed in light of this definition of “addition,” it
cannot be said that he caused any “addition” of a pollutant into
navigable waters. Therefore, summary judgment was proper as
to all four issues, and this Court should affirm the lower court’s
decision in its entirety.
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ARGUMENT
I.

NUWF LACKS STANDING BECAUSE IT FAILS
TO DEMONSTRATE AN INJURY-IN-FACT TO A
MEMBER THAT IS BOTH FAIRLY TRACEABLE
TO MR. BOWMAN’S ACTIONS AND CAPABLE
OF REDRESS.

NUWF’s suit fails for lack of associational standing. Citizen
suits may be expressly authorized by CWA § 505(a), but they do
not escape the Article III standing requirement. See Middlesex
Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 16
(1981). NUWF, an association, cannot establish standing unless
it initially demonstrates that at least one of its members would
have standing in his own regard. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977) (requiring also
germaneness to organizational purpose and non-compulsory
participation of members).
Therefore, at least one NUWF
member must manifest (1) an actual or imminent injury-in-fact,
(2) the causation of which is “fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant,” (3) and that redress is “likely, as opposed
to merely speculative.” See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
Despite submitting affidavits from three different members,
NUWF is unable to show injury-in-fact, causation, or
redressability for any of these individuals. First, the record
reveals the absence of any legally cognizable injury. Second, even
if NUWF could somehow show an injury, the causation of the
injury is not fairly traceable to Mr. Bowman. Finally, the
redressability requirement is equally unmet because it is unclear
that the relief NUWF demands would actually remedy the injury
its members assert. With none of these three elements met,
NUWF’s suit must be dismissed, and this Court should affirm the
district court’s holding that NUWF did not have standing to sue
Mr. Bowman.
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A. NUWF Does Not Present an Injury-in-Fact to Its
Members.
An injury-in-fact is “an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The relevant inquiry concerns injury
to the member, rather than injury to the environment. Laidlaw,
528 U.S. at 181. Thus, any alleged impact to the environment
must directly affect the member in a tangible and specifically
identifiable way. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 73435 (1972). Here, the collective grievances of NUWF members
may be reduced to three primary allegations: (1) Zeke Norton
finds fewer frogs on Mr. Bowman’s property; (2) Dottie Milford
asserts that the river “looks more polluted”; and (3) all three
member-affiants assert that they “feel a loss from the destruction
of the wetlands, fearing the Muddy is more polluted . . . and will
be far more polluted.” R. 6. However, none of their claims
embody a form of legally cognizable harm.
1. Zeke Norton’s interest in “frogging” on the
Bowman property is not a legally protected
interest because trespassing is illegal in New
Union.
At the outset, NUWF may assert its member-affiants’
interests only in the Muddy River and its banks where they claim
to boat, fish, and picnic; trespassing on the Bowman property is
not among its members’ protected interests. The interests of an
environmental plaintiff are confined to areas he or she actually
uses. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 565-66 (citations
omitted). Trespassing, however, is illegal in New Union and is
not a protected interest. R. 6. Accordingly, NUWF cannot
establish standing based on Zeke Norton’s assertion that he no
longer finds any frogs on Mr. Bowman’s property. Mr. Norton
may very well enjoy “frogging” the whole region, but the only
diminution in enjoyment that he alleges is occurring when he
trespasses onto Mr. Bowman’s property.
R. 6.
Whether

11
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“frogging” for recreation or subsistence, Mr. Norton maintains no
protected interest in “frogging” when he violates the law to do so.
2. None of the NUWF member-affiants, including
Dottie Milford, establish any direct harm to
their aesthetic or recreational interests in the
Muddy River.
To establish an environmental injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a personal aesthetic or recreational value in an
affected area has been lessened. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183
(citations omitted). Here, NUWF members have not alleged that
their recreational interest in the Muddy River has been impaired,
and have not sufficiently shown that the disappearance of the
wetland has had any aesthetic impact.
All three NUWF member-affiants admit that they cannot see
any changes to Mr. Bowman’s land from the river. R. 6. Indeed,
the affected land remains hidden behind at least 150 feet of
densely wooded wetland that continues to adjoin the river. Id.
Any injury to their aesthetic value in the Muddy River is further
dispelled when member-affiants do not claim that their
enjoyment of boating, fishing and picnicking along the Muddy
River has been impaired by Mr. Bowman’s actions. Id. Missing
facts cannot be presumed to avoid summary judgment. See Lujan
v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (explaining that
the standard of review favoring the non-moving party on a
summary judgment motion cannot support “‘assuming’ that
general averments embrace the ‘specific facts’ needed to sustain
the complaint”). Hence, the member-affiants have established
only that they continue to enjoy boating, fishing, and picnicking
as they always have.
Furthermore, NUWF cannot rely on member-affiant Dottie
Milford’s vague observation to establish an aesthetic injury. At
her deposition, Ms. Milford commented that the Muddy River
now “looks more polluted to her” than it did before. R. 6. But
without any further specificity, this single unsubstantiated
statement is not enough. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (noting that the “mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position” will not preclude
summary judgment). Demonstrating a “distinct and palpable
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injury,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), calls for at
least some specificity because “aesthetic perceptions are
necessarily personal and subjective.” Ecological Rights Found. v.
Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). The fact
that the river’s very namesake suggests its natural turbidity only
underscores the need for specificity.
Otherwise, an
environmental plaintiff will be allowed to “replace conclusory
allegations of the complaint . . . with conclusory allegations of an
affidavit.” See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 888.
3. The member-affiants’ sense of loss and
subjective fears of increased pollution do not
constitute an injury-in-fact because their fears
are neither realistic nor cause concrete harm.
NUWF also cannot establish an injury-in-fact based on its
members’ sense of “loss from the destruction of the wetlands,” or
their fear that “the Muddy is more polluted as a result and will be
far more polluted if other adjacent wetlands are cleared and
drained.” R. 6. “[G]eneral emotional ‘harm,’ no matter how
deeply felt,” will not establish an injury-in-fact. Humane Soc’y of
U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the
members’ sense of loss by itself is irrelevant. Moreover, their
fears are also insufficient.
First, the member-affiants’ assertions do not establish an
imminent injury because NUWF members fail to offer any
realistic basis for their fears. Standing requires more than just
the plaintiff’s own subjective apprehensions. See City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983). In Lyons, the
plaintiff lacked standing because he could not show that the harm
he feared was likely to occur. Id. at 108. Similarly, NUWF offers
no evidence that the disappearance of Mr. Bowman’s wetland is
actually capable of causing the pollution that its members fear.
An imminent injury does not arise solely out of conjecture. See
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).
Second, the NUWF member-affiants’ concerns have not
actually diminished their aesthetic and recreational enjoyment of
the Muddy River. Under Laidlaw, a plaintiff’s concerns about the
effects of a particular discharge will only constitute an injury-infact to the extent that those concerns directly affect their

13

96 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 4
aesthetic, recreational, or economic interests. 528 U.S. at 183-84;
see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 2000) (establishing injury-infact when affiant limited time spent swimming in lake); Pac.
Lumber, 230 F.3d at 1150 (establishing injury-in-fact when
affiant refrained from fishing and swimming in creek); Pub.
Interest Research Grp. of N. J., Inc., v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d. Cir. 1990) (establishing injury-in-fact
when affiant was discouraged from bird watching on river).
Even under Laidlaw, fear without any concrete effect is not a
legally cognizable harm. See Pollack v. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d
736, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2009). In Pollack, the court held that the
plaintiff could not establish standing in part because his fear of
pollution along Lake Michigan did not affect his recreational
activities. Id. Here too, the NUWF member-affiants do not claim
that they limit their use of the Muddy River for fear of pollution.
R. 6.
Again, there is no evidence that member-affiants’
recreational enjoyment has been impaired at all. NUWF might
argue that Ms. Milford’s fear of pollution has lessened the river’s
aesthetic value for her in that it “looks more polluted.” But
recognizing a purely aesthetic injury from fear is untenable;
courts will have no means to objectively verify whether the injury
is genuine. See David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing,
Environment and Other Contested Terms, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
79, 100 (2004).
Finally, the injury in Laidlaw arose out of evidence that the
plaintiffs limited or curtailed their recreational activities on the
river, knowing it was contaminated with mercury, “an extremely
toxic pollutant.” 528 U.S. at 176, 183-84. Had the defendant’s
discharge been truly harmless, as is the case here, the Court in
Laidlaw would probably not have reached the same conclusion.
See Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects
Probabilistic Standing, But a “Realistic Threat” of Harm Is a
Better Standing Test, 40 Envtl. L. 89, 102 (2010). Therefore, the
injury-in-fact requirement is not satisfied.
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B. Any Pollution in the Muddy River Is Not Fairly
Traceable to the Challenged Actions of Mr.
Bowman.
Standing also requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
causation of his injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court.”
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. The asserted “causal
connection . . . cannot be too speculative, or rely on conjecture
about the behavior of other parties. . . .” Pac. Lumber, 230 F.3d
at 1152.
Scientific certainty is not required, but a mere
exceedance of a permitted limit will not suffice. Powell Duffryn
Terminals, 913 F.2d at 73 n.10. Most circuit courts require a
plaintiff to at least demonstrate that the discharged pollutant
itself actually “causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries
alleged. . . .” Id. at 72; accord Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v.
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1996); Piney
Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 268 F.3d 255, 264 (4th Cir.
2001).
The NUWF member-affiants assert little more than an
unsupported belief that the wetland formerly occupying Mr.
Bowman’s property might have helped to remove some of the
sediment and pollutants from the Muddy River. R. 6. Filling the
part of the wetland, the affiants speculate, has therefore deprived
the river of these purported ecological benefits, in turn causing
the river to become increasingly polluted by other sources wholly
unrelated to Mr. Bowman’s activities. Without any firm evidence,
this sort of attenuated and speculative connection will not confer
standing. Moreover, the material allegedly discharged was
dredged and fill material—not the material that NUWF members
believe is polluting the Muddy River.
Thus, the causal
requirement is also not met.
C. NUWF Fails to Demonstrate That the Relief It
Seeks Would Redress Any of the Purported
Injuries to Its Members.
NUWF presently seeks civil penalties and an order requiring
Mr. Bowman to remove the fill material and restore the swamp,
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but even if it could establish an actual injury to its members,
neither form of relief is appropriate. There can be no standing for
relief that extends beyond the actual injury alleged. Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984). This requirement ensures
that any relief sought substantially relates to the actual injury it
would remedy and applies separately to each form of relief
sought. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185.
Civil penalties are unavailable to private plaintiffs where the
violation is wholly past because they have no interest in what
belongs solely to the public treasury. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998). If Mr. Bowman’s project
were a violation of the CWA, it is now one wholly past as a matter
of law. See infra Part II. There is no realistic possibility that Mr.
Bowman might engage in similar conduct in the future. He is
already subject to an order from NUDEP in which he is
prohibited from clearing any more land and required to maintain
a year-round wetland area along the Muddy River. R. 4. The
decision not to impose civil penalties on Mr. Bowman is well
within the discretion of NUDEP. In a situation such as this, “the
deterrent effect of a claim for civil penalties becomes so
insubstantial or so remote that it cannot support citizen
standing.” See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186.
Likewise, an order to restore the swamp is equally
inappropriate because standing does not exist for harms that
have already been remedied. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009); accord Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107
(“Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap
a plaintiff into federal court. . . .”). For example, in Summers, the
plaintiff lacked standing to assert an injury that had already
been remedied by a prior settlement. 555 U.S. at 494. Here, the
uncontroverted testimony of NUDEP biologists establishes that
the new wetland zone will provide far more ecological benefits
than the former swamp did. R. 6. If anything, Mr. Bowman’s
conveyance of the conservation easement to NUDEP actually
enhances the aesthetic and recreational interests of the NUWF
members.
Standing “assures that ‘there is a real need to exercise the
power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the
complaining party.’” Summers, 555 U.S. at 493 (citation omitted).
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It does not, however, permit a party to petition for relief other
than what is necessary to redress its injury. See id. at 494.
Consequently, NUWF lacks grounds for either form of relief it
requests, and because NUWF cannot demonstrate that its
members would have standing, it lacks standing to sue Mr.
Bowman. Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment should be affirmed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
NUWF’S CLAIM BECAUSE NUWF ALLEGES A
WHOLLY PAST VIOLATION OF THE CWA.

Under CWA § 505(a), a private right of action does not exist
where the defendant’s violation of the CWA is wholly past.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S.
49, 64 (1987) (interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)). Unless a plaintiff
alleges a violation that is ongoing or intermittent, his claim will
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Here,
there is no question that Mr. Bowman’s land-clearing activities
have ended and will not resume. Instead, NUWF relies solely on
an unsupported proposition that the continued presence of
dredged and fill material on his property amounts to a continuing
violation of the CWA. This theory ignores the actual language of
CWA §§ 301(a) and 404(a), contradicts Gwaltney by focusing on
the effect of a violation rather than the violating act itself, and
cannot be supported by precedent. Mr. Bowman’s discrete actions
cannot be construed as anything but actions now wholly past.
Therefore, NUWF’s citizen suit is barred by § 505(a).1

1. In the proceedings below, NUWF relied solely on the theory that the existence
of dredged and fill material itself constituted the continuing violation. To the
extent that NUWF might now try to argue that the draining of the field is a
CWA violation, that argument is precluded because it was not presented before
the district court.
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A. NUWF’s Theory That the Presence of Fill Material
Constitutes Its Own Continuing Violation Is
Inconsistent with the Plain Language of the CWA.
NUWF’s proposition is facially inconsistent with the plain
language of the CWA. In matters of statutory construction,
courts turn first to the “language of the statute itself.” Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980). “Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.” Id. Here, § 301(a) establishes the CWA’s general
prohibition against the unauthorized “discharge of any pollutant.”
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. §
1362(12) (defining “discharge” as “any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source”) (emphasis added).
Similarly, CWA § 404 prohibits the unpermitted “discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters” so as to bring
the property into a different use. Id. § 1344 (emphasis added); 33
C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1) (2008) (defining “discharge of dredged
material” as “any addition of dredged material”). Therefore a
CWA violation occurs with a “discharge,” defined as “addition.”
The present-tense use of two action verbs, “discharge” and
“addition,” is not simply coincidental. See Sierra Club v. El Paso
Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1145 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[s]ection
404 emphasizes the ‘activity’ giving rise to the discharge of
dredged material”). In fact, subsection (f) of § 404 prohibits only
the unpermitted discharge of dredged or fill material when it is
“incidental to any activity.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (emphasis
added). This means that a permit is only required for the act of
discharging dredged or fill material. Thus, a violation of a § 404
limitation occurs when action is taken and at no other time. C.f.
Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810,
818 (9th Cir. 2001) (calculating § 404 violations as incurring with
each action that causes a discharge for purposes of penalty
calculation). Furthermore, a violation occurs only when there is
an “addition” from a point source, which further indicates that fill
remaining is not a continuing violation because there is no longer
a point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12); Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s
Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Next, the absence of any provision concerning past
discharges or discharges that remain is equally significant. It
would be entirely improper to infer that Congress’ omission is
anything but intentional. For example, Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 7002(a)(1)(B) expressly and
unequivocally authorizes citizen suits against “any past or present
generator . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to the
past or present . . . storage . . . or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis
added). In the RCRA, it is clear that Congress made the mere
presence of solid or hazardous waste a continuing violation. In
the CWA, it is unmistakable that Congress contemplated that
individuals might use dredged and fill material to alter the
character of a navigable body of water, see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §
1344(f)(2), but chose not to differentiate the manner of violation
from any discharge. To imply that the discharge of dredged and
fill material in a wetland somehow operates outside the scope of
this scheme is more than the statutory language will permit.
B.

A Continuing Impact Will Not Substitute for
Continuing Conduct Under the Supreme Court’s
Ruling in Gwaltney.

NUWF’s “continuing violation” theory incorrectly focuses on
the consequences of Mr. Bowman’s actions rather than the actual
conduct giving rise to the alleged violation. More importantly, it
is antithetical to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gwaltney. 484
U.S. at 67. Gwaltney addressed whether citizen-plaintiffs could
maintain a claim under § 505(a) when the defendant had ceased
the violating activity—discharging a pollutant in excess of its
permit. Id. at 55. The Court held that citizen-plaintiffs must be
able to allege in good faith that defendant will again discharge a
pollutant in excess of its permit (or without a permit) for subject
matter jurisdiction under § 505(a). Id. at 67. In contrast, the
possibility that some of the pollutants that defendant discharged
in excess of its permit remained in the nation’s water would not
suffice. See id. The continuance of the violation depends on
continuance of the violating conduct—not its continuing effects.
NUWF’s continuing violation theory amounts to nothing
more than a continuing impact theory. The continuing impact
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theory has been argued by plaintiffs when a violator’s past
discharge continues to have an environmental impact; however,
this theory has been consistently rejected for allowing a citizen
suit to proceed. E.g. Remington Arms, 989 F.2d at 1313 (“The
present violation requirement of the [CWA] would be completely
undermined if a violation included the mere decomposition of
pollutants.”); accord Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co.,
756 F.2d 392, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1985).
NUWF might attempt to support its theory by pointing to
Gwaltney’s concurrence, but this too fails to sustain its argument.
Justice Scalia contended that the phrase “to be in violation”
“suggests a state rather than an act,” and that a past violation is
continuing until the violator has “put in place remedial
measures.” 484 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring). This does not
mean what NUWF hopes. Indeed, Justice Scalia concludes that
the remedial measures are to “clearly eliminate the cause of the
violation.” Id. Therefore, the concurrence suggests that violators
should make modifications to the point source to prevent future
violations. This is not an issue here. Mr. Bowman put in place
remedial measures by removing the point source, the bulldozer,
which clearly eliminates the cause of the violation.
NUWF’s attempt to narrow Gwaltney’s reach to only
violations of CWA § 402 limitations is also fruitless. In both §§
402 and 404, the operative language (“discharge”) remains the
same—Congress addressed the discharge of two very different
kinds of pollutants, isolating each into a separate provision, but it
did not change the language identifying when a permit will be
required. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (requiring a permit for the
discharge of dredged and fill material for the purpose of changing
the use of land or interrupting water flow and exempting a list of
other purposes), and 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (requiring a permit for the
discharge of pollutants, including dredged spoil and various types
of fill material per 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)). Therefore, a violation
under § 301(a) for either § 402 or § 404 limitations remains the
same; it requires a discharge. This indicates that Congress
contemplated the ways in which the CWA would treat the
pollutants differently, but the method of violation was not one of
them.
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NUWF’s Attempt to Redefine a Violation of the
CWA Is Unsupported by Precedent and Unjustified
by Policy.

NUWF relies on Sasser v. Administrator to support its theory
that the presence of dredged and fill material can constitute a
continuing CWA violation. 990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993).
However, such reliance is misplaced. Sasser concerned whether
the EPA could assess civil penalties administratively under a
then recent amendment of the CWA since the defendant had
filled his property when the CWA had no provision for civil
penalties. Id. at 129. The court held that the EPA could assess
penalties because the fill material remained on the property. Id.
Beyond the question of retroactive application, this holding is
unremarkable because there is no question that the EPA can
assess penalties for past violations—unlike citizen suits.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319). Sasser was
simply a case of needing to provide the EPA a remedy. There is
no basis for extending this principle to a theory that the presence
of fill material constitutes a continuing violation that will permit
a citizen suit.
Likewise, the two district court cases cited by Sasser do not
support extending its holding beyond the government’s ability to
assess penalties. One simply repeats the other, and neither
involved a citizen suit. See United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F.
Supp. 684, 700 (D.N.J. 1987) (citing United States v. Cumberland
Farms of Conn., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1171 (D. Mass. 1986)).
Cumberland Farms did not concern subject matter jurisdiction
either; it only addressed calculation of penalties. 647 F. Supp. at
1183. There, the government had obtained a court order against
the defendant for illegally filling a wetland. See id. at 1184. Still,
the defendant continued to fill, ditch, and grade the wetland,
violating the court’s order. Id. To punish the defendant, the
district court assessed penalties not only for the days bulldozers
and backhoes were used, but also for every day that the
defendant continued to violate the terms of the injunction. Id. at
1184–85. This is entirely consistent with the CWA, which makes
a violator’s refusal to comply with an injunction a factor in
penalty calculation. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). But here, Mr. Bowman
is not in violation of any court order.
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Beyond penalty calculation, Sasser’s approach receives little
support. E.g., United States v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404,
408 (D. Colo. 1995) rev’d on other grounds 146 F.3d 1241 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on
statute of limitations). No circuit court has applied the Sasser
theory in any context. Moreover, district courts applying Sasser’s
theory do so based solely on trumped up arguments of policy. See
Informed Citizens United, Inc. v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375,
377-78 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (relying on dicta from N.C. Wildlife Fed’n
v. Woodbury, No. 87-584-CIV-5, 1989 WL 106517 (E.D.N.C. Apr.
25, 1989)). Their lines of reasoning have been criticized as
inconsistent with the CWA’s statutory language and Gwaltney.
United States v. Rutherford Oil Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 782, 792
(S.D. Tex. 2010); see also David S. Foster, The Continuing
Violations Doctrine and the Clean Water Act: Untenable Solutions
and a Need for Reform, 32 Envtl. L. 717, 736-37 (2002).
Finding itself without statutory basis or persuasive
precedent, NUWF also turns to a policy argument. However,
there is simply no need for this Court to redefine a violation of the
§ 404 limitation. NUWF argues that unless Sasser’s approach is
adopted, violators will destroy wetlands with impunity, and
injured parties will be deprived of their day in court. However,
this argument ignores the intended role of the citizen suit within
the CWA’s broader statutory scheme: “to supplement rather than
to supplant governmental action.” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. The
EPA and the states, unlike private plaintiffs, can still impose
penalties for past violations. Id. at 58 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319).
Hence, the discharging of dredged and fill material into a wetland
still creates the potential for severe penalties, the penalties
merely cannot be assessed by private citizens. Id.
Moreover, the lack of a private right of action over fill
remaining in a wetland does not prevent the CWA’s goals from
being realized. It is merely a subject that Congress wanted the
government to have discretion in choosing to remedy as it sees fit.
Ultimately, this Court need not decide whether or not NUWF’s
public policy argument is compelling. “Only Congress may
change the law in response to policy arguments, courts may not
do so.” Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 985 F.2d 303,
304 (7th Cir. 1993).
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In conclusion, the district court properly granted summary
judgment because NUWF failed to allege a continuing violation of
the CWA. The mere remainder of fill material in Mr. Bowman’s
swamp cannot constitute a continuous violation under the CWA
because the violation is contingent on a discrete action. NUWF’s
reliance on Sasser is antithetical to the text of the CWA, as well
as the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Gwaltney. Therefore,
this Court should affirm the lower court and hold that NUWF’s
suit is barred by § 505(a) of the CWA.
III.

NUWF’S CITIZEN SUIT IS BARRED BY CWA §
505(b) BECAUSE NUDEP IS DILIGENTLY
PROSECUTING MR. BOWMAN.

NUWF’s claim is also barred under CWA § 505(b) because of
NUDEP’s diligent prosecution of Mr. Bowman.
The CWA
authorizes private enforcement only if state and federal agencies
fail their responsibilities as primary enforcers. See 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)-(b). Citizen suits occupy a secondary role in CWA
enforcement by encouraging state action with the statutory notice
procedure. Steven C. Anderson, Note, Stop Swinging for the
Fences!: An Argument for Citizen Intervention in CWA
Enforcement Actions, 29 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 377, 397
(2009).
Consequently, whenever a state commences and
diligently prosecutes civil actions compelling compliance with the
CWA, any subsequent citizen action will be barred. Indeed, the
need for private enforcement has vanished.
33 U.S.C. §
1365(b)(1)(B); see Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61. Private plaintiffs
may proceed only if they overcome a strong presumption of
diligence on the part of the state. N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n
v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1991). Here,
NUDEP’s action precedes that of NUWF, entitling it to a
presumption of diligence, and NUWF is unable to show that
NUDEP’s efforts have been anything but diligent.
A. NUDEP’s Prosecution of Mr. Bowman Is Presumed
Diligent.
Prosecution of alleged violations of the CWA in the State of
New Union belongs squarely within the authority of NUDEP.
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Again, Congress intended for states to be the primary enforcers of
the CWA. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. Private enforcement
was merely “meant to supplement rather than to supplant
government action.” Id. For this very reason, courts are
extremely deferential to states’ prosecutorial discretion and will
expressly presume diligent enforcement once proceedings have
been commenced. Karr v. Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir.
2007); Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557.
NUDEP, the agency tasked with enforcing the CWA in New
Union, commenced civil enforcement against Mr. Bowman within
forty days of receiving NUWF’s notice of intent to sue and over
twenty days before NUWF filed this lawsuit. R. 4-5. NUDEP
commenced its enforcement in federal district court concerning
the same violations alleged by NUWF—Mr. Bowman’s landclearing activities. R. 4. As a direct result of NUDEP’s efforts,
Mr. Bowman entered into a settlement agreement in which he is
required to cease all land-clearing activities and convey a
conservation easement to NUDEP.
Id.
The negotiated
conveyance includes all of the wooded property adjacent to the
Muddy River plus an additional seventy-five-foot buffer zone on
which Mr. Bowman will construct and maintain an artificial
wetland. Id. According to a NUDEP biologist, this “new, yearround, partially-inundated wetland in the buffer zone will provide
richer wetland habitat than the former, occasionally-inundated
wetland presently occupied by the field.” R. 6. The settlement,
subsequently formalized as an administrative order, is now the
subject of a pending motion for consent decree before the district
court in NUDEP’s lawsuit, which is unopposed by Mr. Bowman.
Id. These actions, all of which predate NUWF’s lawsuit, will be
presumed diligent as a matter of law.
B. NUWF Cannot Rebut the Presumption That
NUDEP Is Diligently Prosecuting Mr. Bowman.
NUWF’s lingering discontent is not enough to rebut the
presumption that NUDEP has prosecuted Mr. Bowman’s alleged
violations diligently. Because Congress intended the states to be
the CWA’s primary enforcers, courts examine their decisions in
an extremely deferential manner. E.g., Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557.
Hence, the presumption of diligence places a heavy burden on a
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prospective plaintiff. Karr, 475 F.3d at 1198; Piney Run Pres.
Ass’n v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008);
Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557. It is not enough for the plaintiff to
simply show that the prosecution “is less aggressive than he
would like” or that the prosecution has resulted in a compromise.
Piney Run, 523 F.3d at 459; accord Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197; see
Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage
Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 762 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 913
(2005). This is because “Congress did not intend for [private
enforcement] to be even ‘potentially intrusive’” on [the state’s]
discretion. Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at
61).
Generally, courts require only that states’ efforts be “‘capable
of requiring compliance with the Act and . . . in good faith
calculated to do so.’” Piney Run, 523 F.3d at 459 (quoting Friends
of Milwaukee’s Rivers, 382 F.3d at 760).
Here, NUDEP’s
negotiated settlement and subsequent administrative order
requires Mr. Bowman to “immediately cease further violations of
§ 404.” R. 7. It is difficult to imagine what actions could be any
more targeted at requiring compliance. Not only have NUDEP’s
negotiations resulted in the cessation of Mr. Bowman’s landclearing, they have also secured additional concessions that
extend far beyond mere compliance. In fact, NUDEP compelled
Mr. Bowman to construct a year-round wetland and convey a
conservation easement that is dedicated to public use. Id. These
actions are certainly capable of, and calculated to ensure,
compliance with the CWA.
This is not a situation where state efforts have proven
ineffective in ending the defendant’s violations. In Friends of
Milwaukee’s Rivers, the state’s prosecution, initiated twenty-five
years earlier, had resulted in sewerage infrastructure that clearly
lacked the capacity to prevent subsequent discharges of sewage
into local waters. 382 F.3d. at 763. And although a later
settlement accomplished a reduction in overflow, the sewerage
district admitted that the changes would not eliminate overflow
altogether. Id. In contrast, NUDEP’s settlement here has
resulted in the complete cessation of activity alleged to be in
violation of the CWA, with no realistic possibility of it resuming
again in the future. R. 4-5.
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NUDEP’s prosecution remains diligent, even if it is not as
sweeping as NUWF would prefer. See Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197.
For example, in Karr, the state took action against fewer
defendants for fewer violations than the citizen-plaintiffs were
charging in their subsequent lawsuit. Id. at 1195. But, because
the subsequent suit was for “essentially the same violations,” the
court held that the private plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
the state’s decisions made its prosecution any less diligent. Id. at
1198-1200. Similarly, NUWF contends that NUDEP’s prior
prosecution is not diligent because it only seeks to stop Mr.
Bowman from future violations, whereas NUWF seeks the
removal of fill remaining on the property and would require the
former swamp to be restored. In reality however, NUDEP’s
actions achieve far more restorative results than NUWF seeks.
R. 6, 7-8. NUWF cannot overcome the presumption that NUDEP
is diligently prosecuting Mr. Bowman simply because it would
choose a different strategy. Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197; Piney Run,
523 F.3d at 459.
Finally, a decision not to pursue civil penalties or any other
particular remedy does not reflect a lack of diligence. See Ark.
Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 1994).
The inquiry focuses solely on “whether the State’s action is going
to bring about compliance.” Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers, 382
F.3d at 762; accord Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557. But more
importantly, allowing citizen suits to proceed where an agency
elects to forego penalties in favor of imposing costly
improvements not otherwise required would be harmful to the
public interest. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61. For example, “[i]f a
defendant is exposed to a citizen suit whenever the EPA grants it
a concession, defendants will have little incentive to negotiate
consent decrees.” Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197.
NUDEP declined to impose civil penalties on Mr. Bowman
because it obtained valuable concessions from him that go further
than simply bringing about compliance—all at great expense to
Mr. Bowman. The cost of constructing the new wetland will be
considerable, and the future expenses in maintaining it are not
yet determinable. R. 8. Mr. Bowman is also relinquishing all
agricultural and developmental value in the public-use easement
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and the maintained wetlands. Mr. Bowman would not have made
these concessions if he were still required to pay penalties.
In conclusion, because NUWF cannot show that NUDEP has
failed to diligently prosecute Mr. Bowman, NUWF’s citizen suit is
barred by CWA § 505(b). Second-guessing NUDEP’s judgment
will only serve to undermine its broader strategy of enforcement.
See Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197-98. NUWF may intervene in
NUDEP’s lawsuit, but only to protect its own interests. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b). Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate, and
the district court’s order should be affirmed.
IV.

MR. BOWMAN DID NOT VIOLATE THE CWA
BECAUSE HE DID NOT ADD A POLLUTANT TO
THE WETLAND.

Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits “the discharge of any
pollutant” without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The CWA
defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C. §
1362(12). The term “addition” is undefined under the CWA, but
is used identically to define discharges under both §§ 402 and
404. Therefore, the term must maintain a consistent meaning
throughout the entire CWA, absent express Congressional intent
to the contrary. See Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury of U.S., 475
U.S. 851, 860 (1986).
The EPA has consistently relied on the “outside world” theory
to define “addition.” E.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693
F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Under that theory, the “addition”
of a pollutant from a point source occurs only when the point
source introduces the pollutant “into navigable water from the
outside world.” Id. at 165. In other words, “[i]f one takes a ladle
of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the
pot, one has not added soup or anything else to the pot.” S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
110 (2004) (quoting Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir.
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The EPA incorporated its “outside world” theory into its
recently promulgated Water Transfers Rule. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i)
(2008). In so doing, the EPA defines “addition” by specifically
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excluding certain activities from that definition; explicitly
excluded is the transfer of pollutants within the same body of
water. Id. This EPA interpretation necessarily includes both the
narrow proposition that “addition” occurs only when a pollutant is
introduced from the outside world and the broader proposition
that all waters are considered “unitary waters.” See generally
Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210
(11th Cir. 2009). Although the “unitary waters” theory is itself
inapplicable here because only one body of water is at issue, the
Water Transfers Rule’s implicit incorporation of the “outside
world” definition of “addition” is relevant here. Because of this
incorporation, the “outside world” theory’s definition of “addition”
is entitled to Chevron deference, and when applied here, Mr.
Bowman’s actions do not constitute an “addition.” Therefore, this
Court should affirm the district court and hold that Mr. Bowman
has not violated CWA § 301(a).
A. The “Outside World” Theory Merits Chevron
Deference Because It Has Been Formally
Incorporated into the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule.
The EPA’s definition of “addition” is entitled to Chevron
deference because it is the agency charged with enforcing and
guiding the issuance of § 404 permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1)(B);
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984). Chevron deference requires a court to defer to
the agency’s interpretation of a statute wherever (1) the statute is
silent or ambiguous on the precise issue, and (2) the agency’s
regulatory interpretation of such issue is reasonable. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843. If both elements are met, “a court may not
substitute its own construction” of the statutory provision, but
rather, “must give effect to [the] agency’s reasonable
interpretation.”
Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1219
(citations omitted).
First, the meaning of an “addition . . . to navigable waters” is
entirely ambiguous in the CWA. The CWA does not define the
term “addition” anywhere in the statute. Instead, Congress
merely dictated that the “discharge of a pollutant” necessarily
includes an “addition.” See 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). The general
purpose of the statute, to “restore and maintain the chemical,
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” does not
provide any further guidance as to what Congress may have
meant by “discharge of a pollutant.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
Congress’ stated purpose is instead extremely “broad and
ambitious.” Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1225. Because the
issue is ambiguous, it is evident that Congress intended the EPA
to provide further guidance.
Second, the EPA’s definition of “addition” in the Water
Transfers Rule is also reasonable. Under the Chevron standard,
“[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill . . .
[s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnote omitted). Even if
the court would decide the issue differently, it “may not
substitute its own construction of a statut[e] . . . for a reasonable
interpretation made by the . . . agency.” Id. at 844 (footnote
omitted). Therefore, as long as the EPA’s interpretation is
reasonable, it must be upheld. Id.
For example, in Friends of Everglades, the court analyzed the
Water Transfers Rule in terms of reasonableness. 570 F.3d at
1228. In looking at the “unitary waters” portion, the court
compared the theory to marbles being transferred between two
buckets. Id. As the Eleventh Circuit describes it, although one
person may say that there are now marbles where there were
none before (in the other bucket), another person could say that
there is still the same amount of marbles in buckets. Id. The
court held that the Water Transfers Rule, which necessarily
includes the “outside world” theory, was certainly not arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute because either
construction is reasonable. Id. Moreover, at least two circuit
courts have already held that the “outside world” theory was both
a reasonable interpretation of “addition,” and not inconsistent
with the purpose or any provisions of the CWA. E.g., Gorsuch,
693 F.2d at 183; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862
F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988).
NUWF may argue that this theory is inapplicable because it
was developed in § 402 litigation, and that the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has promulgated a regulation
defining “discharge of dredged or fill material” under § 404(g).
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See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)-(e). Indeed, the Corps characterized the
“redeposit” of material into the same body of water as an
“addition” requiring a permit. Id. § 323.2 (d)(1)(iii). However, the
Corps’ definition of “addition” directly contradicts the EPA’s
position, thus imposing two diverging meanings of “addition”
under CWA §§ 402 and 404. The EPA may very well believe that
“‘addition’ should be interpreted in accordance with the text of
more specific sections of the [CWA],” such as §§ 402 and 404.
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697, 701 (June 13, 2008).
Still, its fractured conception of statutory interpretation runs
counter to the rules of statutory construction and common sense.
Heidi Hand, Is the EPA’s Unitary Waters Theory All Wet?, 6 Wyo.
L. Rev. 401, 435-36 (2006) (footnotes omitted). Absent Congress’
express intent to the contrary, a statutory term must carry a
unitary definition throughout the CWA. See Sorenson, 475 U.S.
at 860 (citations omitted). In other words, one type of activity
cannot simultaneously constitute an “addition” under § 402, but
not § 404.
The EPA, not the Corps, was designated as the primary
administrator of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d). And although
the Corps is tasked with issuing § 404 permits, “the EPA must
write the guidelines for the Corps to follow in determining
whether to permit a discharge. . . .” Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se.
Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 274 (2009). This
necessarily means that the EPA is given the final say in what
actually constitutes an “addition.” Therefore, to the extent that
the Corps attempts to regulate the redeposit of material as an
“addition” under 33 C.F.R. § 323.2, its regulations are invalid.
Alternatively, NUWF may argue that the EPA’s
interpretation of “addition” is not entitled to Chevron deference
because the rule itself does not define “addition,” or even use the
word. This theory however, ignores the history of the rule. Prior
to the issuance of the rule, EPA produced a memorandum
entitled Agency Interpretation on Applicability of section 402 of
the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers, which concluded that
transfers of water between navigable waters do not constitute an
“addition.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 33, 699. In the final regulation, EPA
concluded that “water transfers, as defined by the rule, do not
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require NPDES permits because they do not result in the
‘addition’ of a pollutant.” Id. (emphasis added). To ignore the
rule’s history is to ignore the very reason for its adoption.
B. Mr. Bowman’s Actions Do Not Constitute an
“Addition” Because He Has Not Introduced a
Pollutant from the “Outside World.”
NUWF may argue that when Mr. Bowman burned the thenleveled vegetation, the resulting ash was a new pollutant from
the “outside world.” Yet, this argument overlooks how courts
have historically addressed what is and what is not an “addition.”
See, e.g., Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175, 183; Consumers Power, 862
F.2d at 584. For example, in Gorsuch, the court held that
pollution caused by a dam did not constitute a discharge of a
pollutant because the pollutants merely passed through the dam
and were not introduced to the water from the dam (the point
source). 693 F.2d at 175. Likewise, in Consumers Power, the
court held that a hydro-electric facility that removed and
returned water containing biological materials from Lake
Michigan did not constitute an “addition” because the biological
material remained in the water throughout the entire transfer.
862 F.2d at 585-86.
In this case, Mr. Bowman’s activities did not introduce any
pollutants into the wetland from the “outside world.” Indeed, all
of the pollutants were already on the Bowman property when the
land-clearing commenced. R. 4. Despite its movement of
biological materials within the wetland, the bulldozer added
nothing to the wetland. Mr. Bowman simply pushed around
material already on his property; he did not add any fill material
collected from any other source. Id. Like in Gorsuch and
Consumers Power, his actions merely passed the pollutant from
one part of his wetland to another part of the same wetland.
Any change in form occurring during an activity is also
immaterial.
See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584.
In
Consumers Power, the pump-back process had the effect of
destroying an enormous amount of fish and other life as the
water passed through the facility’s massive turbines, dumping
their entrails back into Lake Michigan. Id. at 582. Still, the
court held that this transformation of the biological material—
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live fish to a combination of live and dead fish—did not add a
pollutant to the lake. Id. at 585-86. Because the facility did not
create the fish and because live fish are “just as much as a
pollutant” as the mixture, the process did not constitute an
“addition.” Id. In other words, the change in form did not
matter; the only thing that mattered was whether the material
was previously in the water. Id. Like the defendant in
Consumers Power, Mr. Bowman did not create the pollutants, but
merely changed the form of pollutants previously in the wetland,
and those biological materials (vegetation and soil) are just as
much a pollutant as the burned ashes. Undoubtedly, NUWF will
continue to insist that applying the “outside world” theory to §
404 permits would render that provision meaningless. R. 9. This
is certainly not the case as fill material typically comes from dry
land and would still be subject to such permits. Although
requiring the materials to come from somewhere outside the
wetland certainly limits the Corps’ discretion to issue § 404
permits, it does not render the permit program meaningless.
Finally, NUWF’s reliance on United States v. Deaton, 209
F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000), or any other case involving side-casting
decided prior to promulgation of the Water Transfers Rule, is
unhelpful. The Deaton court’s interpretation of “addition” may be
one reasonable interpretation of “addition,” but so too is the
agency’s interpretation. When two reasonable interpretations are
possible, courts must defer to the one chosen by the agency.
Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228. As a result, there was
no “addition” and thus, “no discharge of a pollutant.” Therefore,
no violation of the CWA has occurred. Summary judgment on
this ground should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Mr. Bowman should be affirmed.
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